Parameter-transfer is a well-known and versatile approach for meta-learning, with applications including few-shot learning, federated learning, and reinforcement learning. However, parameter-transfer algorithms often require sharing models that have been trained on the samples from specific tasks, thus leaving the task-owners susceptible to breaches of privacy. We conduct the first formal study of privacy in this setting and formalize the notion of task-global differential privacy as a practical relaxation of more commonly studied threat models. We then propose a new differentially private algorithm for gradient-based parameter transfer that not only satisfies this privacy requirement but also retains provable transfer learning guarantees in convex settings. Empirically, we apply our analysis to the problem of federated learning with personalization and show that allowing the relaxation to task-global privacy from the more commonly studied notion of local privacy leads to dramatically increased performance in recurrent neural language modeling.
INTRODUCTION
The field of meta-learning offers promising directions for improving the performance and adaptability of machine learning methods. At a high level, the key assumption leveraged by these approaches is that the sharing of knowledge gained from individual learning tasks can help catalyze the learning of similar unseen tasks. However, the collaborative nature of this process, in which task-specific information must be sent to and used by a meta-learner, also introduces inherent data privacy risks.
In this work, we focus on a popular and flexible meta-learning approach, parameter transfer via gradient-based meta-learning (GBML). This set of methods, which includes well-known algorithms such as MAML (Finn et al., 2017) and Reptile (Nichol et al., 2018) , tries to learn a common initialization φ over a set of tasks t = 1, . . . , T such that a high-performance model can be learned in only a few gradient-steps on new tasks. Notably, information flows constantly between training tasks and the meta-learner as learning progresses; to make iterative updates, the meta-learner obtains feedback on the current φ by training task-specific modelsθ t with it.
Meanwhile, in many settings it is crucial to ensure that sensitive information in each task-specific dataset stays private. Examples of this include learning models for next-word prediction on cell phone data , clinical predictions using hospital records , and fraud detectors for competing credit card companies (Stolfo et al., 1997) . In such cases, each data-owner can benefit from information learned from other tasks, but each also desires, or is legally required, to keep their raw data private. Thus, it is not sufficient to learn a well-performing φ; it is equally imperative to ensure that a task's sensitive information is not obtainable by anyone else.
While parameter transfer algorithms can move towards this goal by peforming task-specific optimization locally, thus preventing direct access to private data, this provision is far from fail-safe in terms of privacy. A wealth of work has shown in the single-task setting that it is possible for an adversary with only access to the model to learn detailed information about the training set, such as the presence or absence of specific records (Shokri et al., 2017) or the identities of sensitive features given other covariates (Fredrikson et al., 2015) . Furthermore, Carlini et al. (2018) showed that deep neural networks can effectively memorize user-unique training examples, which can be recovered even after only a single epoch of training. As such, in parameter-transfer methods, the meta-learner or any downstream participant can potentially recover data from a previous task.
However, despite these serious risks, privacy-preserving meta-learning has remained largely an unstudied problem. Our work aims to address this issue by applying differential privacy (DP) (Dwork and Roth, 2014) , a well-established definition of privacy with rich theoretical guarantees and consistent empirical success at preventing leakages of data (Carlini et al., 2018; Fredrikson et al., 2015; Jayaraman and Evans, 2019) . Crucially, although there are various threat models and degrees of DP one could consider in the meta-learning setting (as we outline in Section 2), we balance the well-documented trade-off between privacy and model utility by formalizing and focusing on a setting that we call task-global DP. This setting provides a strong privacy guarantee for each task-owner that sharingθ t with the meta-learner will not reliably reveal anything about specific training examples to any downstream agent. It also allows us to use the framework of Khodak et al. (2019a) to provide a DP GBML algorithm that enjoys provable learning guarantees in convex settings.
Finally, we show an application of our work by drawing connections to federated learning (FL). While standard methods for FL, such as FedAvg , have inspired many works also concerning DP in a multi-user setup (Agarwal et al., 2018; Geyer et al., 2018; Truex et al., 2019) , we are the first to consider task-global DP as a useful variation on standard DP settings. Moreover, these works fundamentally differ from ours in that they do not consider a task-based notion of learnability as they aim to learn a single global model (since by design they focus on the global federated learning problem). That being said, a federated setting involving per-user personalization (Chen et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2017 ) is a natural meta-learning application.
More specifically, our main contributions are:
1. We are the first to taxonomize the different notions of DP possible for meta-learning; in particular, we formalize on a variant we call task-global DP, showing and arguing that it adds a useful option to commonly studied settings in terms of trading privacy and accuracy. 2. We propose the first DP GBML algorithm, which we construct to satisfy this privacy setting.
Further, we show a straightforward extension for obtaining a group DP version of our setting to protect multiple samples simultaneously. 3. While our privacy guarantees hold generally, we also prove learning-theoretic results in convex settings. Our learning guarantees scale with task-similarity, as measured by the closeness of the task-specific optimal parameters (Denevi et al., 2019; Khodak et al., 2019b) . 4. We show that our algorithm, along with its theoretical guarantees, naturally carries over to federated learning with personalization. Compared to previous notions of privacy considered in works for DP federated learning (Agarwal et al., 2018; Bhowmick et al., 2019; Geyer et al., 2018; Truex et al., 2019) , we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to simultaneously provide both privacy and learning guarantees. 5. Empirically, we demonstrate that our proposed privacy setting allows for strong performance on non-convex federated language modeling tasks. We achieve close to the performance of nonprivate models and significantly improve upon the performance of models trained with local-DP guarantees, a previously studied notion that also provides protections against the meta-learner. Our setting reasonably relaxes this latter notion but can achieve roughly 2.5 times the performance on a modified version of the Shakespeare dataset and 2.7 times the performance on a modified version of Wiki-3029 (Arora et al., 2019 ).
RELATED WORK
DP Algorithms in Federated Learning Settings. Works most similar to ours focus on providing DP for federated learning. Specifically, Geyer et al. (2018) and apply update clipping and the Gaussian Mechanism to achieve global DP federated learning algorithms for language modeling and image classification tasks, respectively. Their methods are shown to only suffer minor drops in accuracy compared to non-private training but they do not consider protections to inferences made by the meta-learner. Alternatively, Bhowmick et al. (2019) does achieve such protection by applying a theoretically rate-optimal local DP mechanism on theθ t 's users send to the meta-learner. However, they sidestep hard minimax rates (Duchi et al.) by assuming limited adversaries have limited side-information and allowing for a large privacy budget. In this work, though we achieve a relaxation of the privacy of Bhowmick et al. (2019) , we do not restrict the adversary's power. Finally, Truex et al. (2019) does consider a setting that coincides with task-global DP, but they focus primarily on the added benefits of applying MPC (see below) rather than studying the merits of the setting in comparison to other potential settings. Although these approaches all study privacy through the lens of learning a single global model, many of them, as well as our proposed GBML algorithm, are naturally amenable to a federated learning setting with personalization.
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC). MPC is a cryptographic technique that allows parties to calculate a function of their inputs while also maintaining the privacy of each individual party's inputs (Bonawitz et al., 2017) . In GBML, sets of model updates may come in a batch from multiple tasks, and hence MPC can securely aggregate the batch before it is seen by the meta-learner. Though MPC itself gives no DP guarantees, it prevents the meta-learner from directly accessing any one task's updates and can thus be combined with DP to increase privacy. Analogues of this approach have been studied in the federated setting, e.g. by Agarwal et al. (2018) , who apply SMC in the same difficult setting of Bhowmick et al. (2019) , and Truex et al. (2019) , who apply SMC similarly to a setting analogous to ours. On the other hand, MPC also comes with additional practical challenges such as peer-to-peer communication costs, drop outs, and vulnerability to collaborating participants. As such, combined with its applicability to multiple settings, including ours, we consider MPC to be an orthogonal direction.
PRIVACY IN A META-LEARNING CONTEXT
In this section, we first formalize the meta-learning setting that we consider. We then describe the various threat models that arise in the GBML setup, before presenting the different DP notions that can be achieved. Finally, we highlight the specific model and type of DP that we analyze.
PARAMETER TRANSFER META-LEARNING
In parameter transfer meta-learning, we assume that there is a set of learning tasks t = 1, . . . , T , each with its corresponding disjoint training set
where each z t,i ∈ X × Y. The goal within each task is to learn a function fθ t : X → Y parameterized byθ t ∈ Θ ⊂ R d that performs "well," generally in the sense that it has low within-task population risk in the distributional setting. The meta-learner's goal is to learn an initialization φ ∈ Θ that leads to a well-performingθ t within-task. In GBML this φ is learned via an iterative process that alternates between the following two steps: (1) a within-task procedure where a batch of task-owners B receives the current φ and each t ∈ B uses φ as an initialization for running a within-task optimization procedure, obtainingθ t (D t , φ); (2) a meta-level procedure where the meta-learner receives these model updates {θ t } t∈B and aggregates them to determine an updated φ.
Notably, since both sub-procedures only need to receive the output from the other, an overall GBML algorithm can modularly change each one. From a privacy standpoint, even if the within-task sub-procedure is always done locally, specific information about z t,i ∈ D t is vulnerable to being inferred by anyone who receivesθ t , namely the meta-learner. Similarly, the meta-level procedure can potentially reveal sensitive information about previously seen task-owner's through revealingθ t to future recipients of φ, thus leaving task-owners vulnerable to each other.
THREAT MODELS FOR GBML
As in any privacy endeavor, before discussing particular mechanisms, a key specification must be made in terms of what threat model is being considered. In particular, it must be specified both (1) who the potential adversaries are and (2) what information needs to be protected.
Potential adversaries. For a single task-owner, adversaries may be either solely recipients of φ (i.e. other task-owners) or recipients of either φ orθ t (i.e. also the meta-learner). In the latter case, we consider only a honest-but-curious meta-learner, who does not deviate from the agreed upon algorithm but may try to make inferences based on the information it receives. In both cases, concern is placed not only about the intentions of these other participants, but also their own security against access by malicious outsiders. Data to be protected. A system can choose either to protect information contained in single records z t,i one-at-a-time or to protect entire datasets D t simultaneously. This distinction between record-level and task-level privacy can be practically important. Multiple z t,i within D t may reveal the same secret (e.g., a cell-phone user has sent their SSN multiple times), or the entire distribution of D t could reveal sensitive information (e.g., a user has sent all messages in a foreign language). In these cases, record-level privacy may not be sufficient. However, given that privacy and utility are often at odds, we often seek the weakest notion of privacy needed in order to best preserve utility.
In related work, focus has primarily been placed on task-level protections. However, these works usually fall into two extremes, either obtaining strong learning but having to trust the meta-learner Geyer et al., 2018) or trusting nobody but also obtaining low performance (Bhowmick et al., 2019) . In response, we try to bridge the gap between these threat models by considering a model that makes a relaxation from task-level to record-level privacy but retains protections for each task-owner against all other parties. This relaxation can be reasonably justified in practical situations, as while task-level guarantees are strictly stronger, they may also be unnecessary. In particular, record-level guarantees are likely to be sufficient whenever single records each pertain to different individuals. For example, for hospitals, what we care about is providing privacy to the individual patients and not aggregate hospital information. For cell-phones, if one can bound the number of texts that could contain the same sensitive information, then an straightforward extension of our setting and methods, which protects up to k records simultaneously, could also be sufficient.
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY (DP) IN A SINGLE-TASK SETTING
In terms of actually achieving privacy guarantees for machine learning, a de-facto standard has been to apply DP, a provision which strongly limits what one can infer about the examples a given model was trained on. Assuming a training set D = {z 1 , . . . , z m }, two common types of DP are considered.
Differential Privacy (Global DP). A randomized mechanism M is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all measurable S ⊆ Range(M) and for all datasets D, D that differ by at most one element:
If this holds for D, D differing by at most k elements, then (ε, δ) k-group DP is achieved.
Local Differential Privacy. A randomized mechanism M is (ε, δ)-locally differentially private if for any two possible training examples z, z ∈ X × Y and measurable S ⊆ X × Y:
Global DP guarantees that it will be hard to infer the presence of a specific record in the training set by observing the output of M. It assumes a trusted aggregator running M gets to see D directly and then privatizes the final output (usually by adding noise throughout training). On the other hand, local DP assumes a stronger threat model in which the aggregator also cannot be trusted. Thus, a random mechanism must be applied individually on each z before the aggregator sees it. Local DP is a stronger guarantee as being (ε, δ)-locally DP implies being (ε, δ)-global DP by invariance to post-processing (Dwork and Roth, 2014) , but it also generally results in worse model performance, since it suffers from provably hard minimax rates Duchi et al..
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR A GBML SETTING
In meta-learning, there exists a hierarchy of agents and statistical queries, so we cannot as simply define global and local DP. Here, both the meta-level sub-procedure ,{θ t } t∈B → φ, and the withintask sub-procedure, {z t,i } mt i=1 →θ t , can be considered individual queries and a DP algorithm can implement either to be DP. Further, for each query, the procedure may be altered to satisfy either local DP or global DP. Thus, there are four fundamental options that follow from standard DP definitions.
(1) Global DP: Releasing φ will at no point compromise information regarding any specificθ t .
(2) Local DP: Additionally, eachθ t is protected from being revealed to the meta-learner. (3) Task-Global DP: Releasingθ t will at no point compromise any specific z t,i . (4) Task-Local DP: Additionally, each z t,i is protected from being revealed to task-owner. To form analogies to single-task DP, the examples in the meta-level procedure are the model updates and the aggregator is the meta-learner. For the within-task procedure, the examples are actually the individual records and the aggregator is the task-owner. As such, (1) is implemented by the metalearner, (2) and (3) are implemented by the task-owner, and (4) is implemented by record-owners.
By immunity to post-processing, the guarantees for (3) and (4) also automatically apply to the release of any future iteration of φ, thus protecting against future task-owners as well. Meanwhile, though (1) and (2) by definition protect the identities of individualθ t , they actually mask the entire presence or absence of any task, thus satisfying a task-level threat model. Intuitively, not being able to infer anything aboutθ t implies that nothing can be inferred about the D t that was used to generate it.
As a consequence, we can thus directly compare (ε, δ) versions of (2) and (3) since both are mechanisms implemented by task-owners. Indeed, as we prove in the Appendix, we have: Remark 2.1. If a GBML algorithm achieves (ε, δ)-local DP at the meta-level, it is also guaranteed to be (ε, δ)-task-global DP.
The converse, on the other hand, is not generally true, as while some task-global-DP mechanisms may result in a local-DP guarantee, the particular (ε, δ) will not necessarily carry over. Both ensure that each task-owner has guarantee for releasingθ t , but achieving local DP implies a task-level guarantee at the within-task level, while global DP at a within-task level may only provide record-level guarantees.
TASK-GLOBAL DP IN COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS WORKS
Using the terminology we introduce in Section 2.4, previous works for DP in federated settings can be categorized as in Table 1 . While these works do not assume a multi-task setting, the terms global/local and task-global/task-local can still analogously refer to releasing the global model (done by the central server) and user-specific updates (done locally on users' devices), respectively.
Algorithm 1: Online version of our (ε, δ)-meta-private parameter-transfer algorithm. Meta-learner picks first meta-initialization φ 1 ∈ Θ.
Meta-learner sends meta-initialization φ t to task t. Task-learner runs OGD starting from θ t,1 = φ t on losses
to getθ t . Task-learner sendsθ t to meta-learner. Meta-learner constructs loss t (φ) = 1 2 θ t − φ t 2 2 . Meta-learner picks meta-initialization φ t+1 using an OCO algorithm on 1 , . . . , t .
Geyer et al. (2018) and both directly provide global DP boosted by subsampling and show how they can achieve performance very close to non-private training. However, this privacy guarantee may be provide may be fundamentally insufficient if there is reason to distrust the central server or the security of accessing its computations. Task-global DP, in comparison provides record-level protections but it does protect against these additional potential adversaries.
In contrast, both Bhowmick et al. (2019) and Agarwal et al. (2018) provide some form of local DP. a strictly stronger setting than task-global DP. However, Bhowmick et al. (2019) shows it needs to concede a very large privacy budget in order to achieve reasonable performance. Agarwal et al. (2018) also consider what is effectively a local DP guarantee but leverages SMC to reduce the amount of randomization needed per task-owner. As mentioned in 1.1, this comes with additional practical challenges and is somewhat of an orthogonal direction. Indeed, Truex et al. (2019) considers applying SMC to improve what are inherently task-global DP mechanisms.
Lastly, we remark that local-within-task DP has not previously been studied as protecting individual data points from task-owners is something that is unlikely to be a concern (eg. cell phone users already own their text messages and one would assume patients already trust their hospitals).
Overall, in contrast to past works, we note that we are the first to formalize and consider the advantages and trade-offs implicit in privatizing the within-task algorithm. Additionally, we show task-global DP is the first notion of DP that can be shown to enjoy any form of provable meta-learning guarantees (Section 3) and also that it empirically improves upon local DP in terms of utility (Section 4).
DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE PARAMETER-TRANSFER

ALGORITHM
We now present our DP GBML method, which is written out in its online (regret) form in Algorithm 1. Here, we observe that both within-task optimization and meta-optimization are done using some form of gradient descent. The key difference between this algorithm and traditional GBML is that since task-learners must send back privatized model updates, each now applies an DP gradient descent procedure to learnθ t when called. However, at meta-test time the task-learner will run a non-private descent algorithm to obtain the parameterθ t used for inference, as this parameter does not need to be sent to the meta-learner. To obtain learning-theoretic guarantees, we use a variant of Algorithm 1 in which the DP algorithm is an SGD procedure (Bassily et al., Algorithm 1) that adds a propertly scaled Gaussian noise vector at each iteration. A stability result due to Bassily et al. regarding the population loss of this algorithm's output allows us to provide bounds on the transfer risk due to our meta-algorithm.
PRIVACY GUARANTEES
We run a certified (ε, δ)-DP version of SGD (Bassily et al., Algorithm 1) within each task. Therefore, this guarantees that the contribution of each task-owner, aθ t trained on their data, carries global DP guarantees with respect to the meta-learner. Additionally, since DP is preserved under post-processing, the release of any future calculation stemming fromθ t also carries the same DP guarantee.
LEARNING GUARANTEES
Our learning result follows the setup of Baxter (2000) , who formalized the LTL problem as using task-distribution samples P 1 , . . . , P T ∼ Q from some meta-distribution Q and samples indexed by i = 1, . . . , m from those tasks to improve performance when a new task P is sampled from Q and we draw m samples from it. In the setting of parameter-transfer meta-learning we are learning functions parameterized by real-valued vectors θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R d , so our goal will follow that of Denevi et al. (2019) and Khodak et al. (2019b) in seeking bounds on the transfer-risk -the distributional performance of a learned parameter on a new task from Q -that improve with task similarity.
The specific task-similarity metric we consider is the average deviation of the risk-minimizing parameters of tasks sampled from the distribution Q are close together. This will be measured in-terms of the following quantity: V 2 = min φ∈Θ 1 2 E P∼Q θ P − φ 2 2 , for θ P ∈ arg min θ∈Θ P (θ) a risk-minimizer of task-distribution P. This quantity is roughly the variance of risk-minimizing task-parameters and is a standard quantifier of improvement due to meta-learning (Denevi et al., 2019; Khodak et al., 2019b) . For example, Denevi et al. (2019) show excess transfer-risk guarantees
when T tasks with m samples are drawn from the distribution. This guarantee ensures that as we see more tasks our transfer risk becomes roughly V / √ m, which if the tasks are similar, i.e. V is small, implies that LTL improves over single-task learning.
In Algorithm 1, each user t obtains a within-task parameterθ t by running (non-private) OGD on a sequence of losses t,1 , . . . , t,m and averaging the iterates. The regret of this procedure, when averaged across the users, implies a bound on the expected excess transfer risk of new task from Q when running OGD from a learned initialization (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2004) . Thus our goal is to bound this regret in terms of V ; here we follow the Average Regret-Upper-Bound Analysis (ARUBA) framework of Khodak et al. (2019b) and treat meta-update procedure itself as an online algorithm optimizing a bound on the performance measure (regret) of each within-task algorithm. As OGD's regret depends on the squared distance 1 2 θ * t − φ t 2 2 of the optimal parameter from the initialization φ t , with no privacy concerns one could simply update φ t using θ * t ∈ arg min θ∈Θ m i=1 t,i (θ) to recover guarantees similar to those in Denevi et al. (2019) and Khodak et al. (2019b) .
However, this approach requires sending θ * t to the meta-learner, which is not private; instead in Algorithm 1 we sendθ t , which is the output of noisy SGD. To apply ARUBA, we need an additional assumption -that the losses satisfy the following quadratic growth (QG) property: for some α > 0,
Here θ P is the risk minimizer of P . This assumption, which Khodak et al. (2019a) show is reasonable in settings such as logistic regression, amounts to a statistical non-degeneracy assumption on the parameter-space -that parameters far away from the risk-minimizer do not have low-risk. Note that QG is significantly weaker than strong convexity, which previous work (Finn et al., 2019) has assumed to hold for task losses but does not hold for applicable cases such as few-shot least-squares or logistic regression if the number of task-samples is smaller than the data-dimension.
We are now able to state our main theoretical result, a proof of which is given in Appendix B. The result follows from a bound on the task-average regret (TAR) across all tasks of a simple online meta-learning procedure that treats the updateθ t sent by each task as an approximation of the optimal parameter in hindsight θ * t . Since this parameter determines regret on that task, by reducing the meta-update procedure to OCO on this sequence of functions in a manner similar to (Khodak et al., 2019a) , we are able to show a task-similarity-dependent bound on the TAR. Following this the statistical guarantee stems from a nested online-to-batch conversion, a standard procedure to convert low-regret online-learning algorithms to low-risk distribution-learning algorithms. Theorem 3.1. Suppose Q is a distribution over task-distributions P over G-Lipschtz, β-Lipschitzsmooth, 1-bounded convex loss functions : Θ → R over parameter space Θ with diameter D, and let each P satisfy the quadratic growth property (1). Suppose the distribution P t of each task is sampled i.i.d. from Q and we run Algorithm 1 with the (ε, δ)-DP procedure of Bassily et al., Algorithm 1 to obtainθ t as the average iterate for the meta-update step.
we have the following bound on the expected transfer risk when a new task P is sampled from Q, m samples are drawn i.i.d. from P, and we run OGD with learning rate η starting fromφ = 1 T T t=1 φ t and use the averageθ of the resulting iterates as the learned parameter:
Here θ * is any element of Θ and the outer expectation is taken over t,i ∼ P t ∼ Q and the randomness of the within-task DP mechanism. Note that this procedure is (ε, δ)-DP.
Theorem 3.1 shows that one can usefully run a DP-algorithm as the within-task method in metalearning and still obtain improvement due to task-similarity. Specifically, the standard term of 1/ √ m is multiplied by V , which is small if the tasks are related via the closeness of their risk minimizers. Thus we can use meta-learning to improve within-task performance relative to single-task learning. We also obtain a very fast convergence of 1/T √ m in the number of tasks. However, we do gain some o(1/ √ m) terms due to the quadratic growth approximation and the privacy mechanism. Note that the assumption that both the functions and its gradients are Lipschitz-continuous are standard and required by the noisy SGD procedure of Bassily et al.. This theorem also gives us a relatively straightforward extension if the desire is to provide (ε, δ)-group-DP. Since any privacy mechanism that provides (ε, δ)-DP also provides (kε, ke (k−1) δ)-DP guarantees for groups of size k (Dwork and Roth, 2014), we immediately have the following corollary. Corollary 3.1. Under the same assumptions and setting as Theorem 3.1, achieving (ε, δ)-group DP is possible with the same guarantee except replacing
For constant k, this allows us to enjoy the stronger guarantee while maintaining largely the same learning rates. This is a useful result given that in some settings, it may be desired to simultaneously protect small groups of size k << m t , such as protecting entire families for hospital records.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present results that show it is possible to learn useful deep models in federated scenarios while still preserving task-global privacy. In particular, our focus is to evaluate the performance of models that have been optimzied with a task-global DP algorithm in comparison to models that are trained both non-privately and models that were trained with the previously more commonly studied local DP. To this end, we evaluate performance of a LSTM RNN for language modeling tasks and apply a practical variant of Algorithm 1 that considers both tasks and within-task examples in batches instead of serially. To obtain within-task privacy, we alter the within-task algorithm to be DP-SGD algorithm as implemented by TensorFlow Privacy 1 and to obtain local privacy we use a modification of where each task separately applies a Gaussian Mechanism on a singleθ t before sending model updates to the meta-learner.
Datasets:
We train a next word predictor for two federated datasets: (1) The Shakespeare dataset as preprocessed by , and (2) a dataset constructed from 3, 000 Wikipedia articles drawn from the Wiki-3029 dataset (Arora et al., 2019) , where each article is used as a different task. For each dataset, we set a fixed number of tokens per task, discard tasks with fewer tokens than the specified, and discard samples from those tasks with more. We set the number of tokens per task to 800 for Shakespeare and to 1, 600 for Wikipedia, divide tokens into sequences of length 10, and we refer to these modified datasets as Shakespeare-800 and Wiki-1600.
Meta Learning Algorithm. We study the performance of our method when applied to the batch version of Reptile (Nichol et al., 2018) (which, in our setup, reduces to personalized Federated Averaging when the meta-learning rate is set to 1.0). We tune various configurations of task batch size for all methods and for the non-private baseline, we also tune for multiple visits per client since there is no privacy degradation to account for. Additionally, we implement an exponential decay on the meta learning rate. We defer a full discussion of hyperparameter tuning to the Appendix. Privacy Considerations. For the task-global DP models, we set δ = 10 −3 for each task in both Shakespeare-800; and Wiki-1600 and we implement it the tools provided by TensorFlow Privacy. Although their mechanism differs from the one presented in Section 3, it still lets us explore taskglobal privacy in a realistic setting. We use the the RDP accountant provided in order to keep track of our privacy budget, obtaining ε = 9.21 for both Shakespeare and Wikipedia. Finally, for both datasets, we make sure that all tasks and their samples are only seen once, as we cannot leverage any sub-sampling results if the meta-learner can directly see who is sending updates each round.
For the local-DP training, even though this notion of DP is stronger, we explore the same privacy budgets so as to obtain guarantees that are of the same confidence. Here, we run the DP-FedAvg algorithm from with two key changes. First, we add Gaussian noise to each clipped set of model updates before returning them to the central server instead of after aggregation. Secondly, we iterate through tasks without replacement with a fixed batch size rather than sampling each task with independent probability in each new round. The first change gives us local DP, and the second is necessary since multiple visits to a single client results in significant degradation of the privacy guarantee and we want each client to end up with the same final privacy parameters.
Results. Figure 2 shows the performance of both the non-private and task-global private versions of Reptile (Nichol et al., 2018) on the Shakespeare and Wikipedia datasets. As expected, in neither case does the private (noised) version reach the same accuracy of the non-private (noiseless) version of the algorithm. Nonetheless, the private version still comes within 86% of the non-private accuracy for Shakespeare-800 and within 82% for Wiki-1600. Meanwhile achieving local-meta-level DP results in only about 30% of the non-private accuracy on both Shakespeare-800 and Wiki-1600.
In practice, these differences could be toggled by changing the privacy budget for the algorithm, or for a given privacy budget, trading off more training iterations for larger noise multipliers.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have outlined and studied the issue of privacy in the context of meta-learning. Focusing on the class of gradient-based parameter-transfer methods, we used differential privacy to address the privacy risks posed to task-owners by sharing task-specific models with a central meta-learner. To do so, we formalized and considered the notion of task-global differential privacy, which guarantees that individual examples from the tasks are protected from all downstream agents (and particularly the meta-learner). Working in this privacy model, we developed a differentially private algorithm that guarantees both this strong protection as well as learning-theoretic results in the convex setting. Finally, we demonstrate how this notion of privacy can translate into useful deep learning models for federated tasks.
A LOCAL-META-LEVEL DP AND TASK-GLOBAL DP Remark A.1. If a GBML algorithm achieves (ε, δ)-local DP at the meta-level, it is also guaranteed to be (ε, δ)-DP at a task-global level.
Proof. According to the definition of local DP, a mechanism M that achieves (ε, δ)-local DP for releasing φ must satisfy for anyθ t ,θ t ∈ Θ and S ⊆ Θ:
Hereθ t can also be seen as a function, possibly stochastic, of D t , or more formally,
where φ is an initialization and
This holds by definition when A φ is deterministic sinceθ t andθ t are single elements from Θ. When θ t andθ t are stochastic, this bound also holds since it holds even in the worst case for any single pair of elements in Θ. Further, the bound holds no matter how many elements differ between D t and D t , as long as A φ outputs something in Θ. Thus, if we treat M(A φ (·)) as one mechanism, we get the given proposition.
B PROOFS OF LEARNING GUARANTEES
Throughout this section we assume all subsets are convex and in R d unless explicitly stated. In the online learning setting we will use the shorthand ∇ t to denote the subgradient of t : Θ → R evaluated at action θ t ∈ Θ. For any x 1 , . . . , x T ∈ R d we will use x 1:t to refer to the sum of the first t of them.
In this section we first prove (Theorem B.1) a general averaged-regret bound following the ARUBA framework of Khodak et al. (2019b) . We then combine an algorithmic stability based (ε, δ)-DP generalization bound for noisy SGD of Bassily et al. with a quadratic growth assumption (Karimi et al., 2016; Khodak et al., 2019a) to show that such an algorithm returns a meta-update parameterθ that is close θ * and thus suffices to show a meaningful task-averaged-regret guarantee (Corollary B.1). We conclude by using this bound to derive a guarantee in the statistical LTL setting (Corollary B.2). Setting B.1. We assume all functions t,i : Θ → [0, 1] are convex and G-Lipschitz for some G ≥ 1 and that Θ has 2 -diameter D ≥ 1. We define the following quantities:
• convenience coefficients σ = G √ m
Hyperparameters:
We tune the hyperparameters on the set of meta-validation tasks. For all datasets and all versions of the meta-learning algorithm, we tune hyperparameters in a two step process. We first tune all the parameters that are not related to refinement: the meta learning rate, the local (within-task) meta-training learning rate, the maximum gradient norm, and the decay constant. Then, we use the configuration with the best accuracy pre-refinement and then tune the refinement parameters: the refine learning rate, refine batch size, and refine epochs.
All other hyperparameters are kept fixed for the sake of comparison: full batch steps were taken on within-task data, with the maximum number of microbatches used for the task-global DP model. The parameter search spaces are given in Tables 2, 3 , 4. In these tables, the final hyperparameters we used are in bold. 
